Constitutional Law - Eighth Amendment - Cruel and Unusual Punishment - Proportionality Guarantee by Marton, Christine D.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 30 Number 2 Article 10 
1992 
Constitutional Law - Eighth Amendment - Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment - Proportionality Guarantee 
Christine D. Marton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christine D. Marton, Constitutional Law - Eighth Amendment - Cruel and Unusual Punishment - 
Proportionality Guarantee, 30 Duq. L. Rev. 387 (1992). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol30/iss2/10 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EIGHTH AMENDMENT-CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT-PROPORTIONALITY GUARANTEE-The United States
Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment contains no pro-
portionality guarantee and thus upheld a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment with no possibility of parole for possession of
672.5 grams of cocaine in violation of a Michigan statute.
Harmelin v Michigan, US , 111 S Ct 2680 (1991).
Ronald Allen Harmelin (hereinafter "petitioner") was convicted
of possessing 672.5 grams of cocaine, a violation of Michigan's Pub-
lic Health Code,' and consequently received a mandatory sentence
of life in prison without possibility of parole. On May 12, 1986,
two Oak Park police officers twice observed the petitioner's car en-
tering a motel parking lot in which several stolen vehicles had pre-
viously been found. The officers stopped the petitioner after they
observed the petitioner's vehicle making a U-turn at an intersec-
tion without stopping for a red light.4 The petitioner stepped out
of his car and informed one of the two officers that he was carrying
1. Mich Comp Laws Ann § 333.7403(2)(a)(i) (Supp 1990-91) makes possession of 650
grams or more of "any mixture containing [a schedule 2] controlled substance" a crime for
which an offender receives a mandatory sentence of life in prison. Cocaine is labeled as a
schedule 2 controlled substance in § 333.7214(a)(iv). Harmelin v Michigan, US ,111
S Ct 2680, 2684 n 1 (1991). Eligibility for parole after ten years in prison is allowed pursuant
to § 791.234(4) with the exception of those convicted of either first-degree murder or a "ma-
jor controlled substance offense," which is defined in § 791.233b[1](b) as including a viola-
tion of § 333.7403. Id.
The petitioner was also convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony, a violation of Mich Comp Laws § 750.227b, for which he was sentenced to two years
in prison. People v Harmelin, 176 Mich App 525, 440 NW2d 75, 76-77 (1989). This convic-
tion is not at issue in this note.
2. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2684.
3. Harmelin, 440 NW2d at 77.
4. Id.
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a pistol for which he had a permit.5 The same officer, however, was
concerned for his own safety and subsequently performed a pat-
down search of the petitioner during which the officer discovered a
quantity of marijuana in the petitioner's coat pocket.6 After the
petitioner's arrest, his car was impounded.7 A search of the vehicle
resulted in the discovery of two bags of white powder, later identi-
fied as 672.5 grams of cocaine."
The petitioner was convicted in the Oakland Circuit Court and
appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals.9 The Michigan Court
of Appeals reversed the conviction, ruling that the Michigan Con-
stitution had been violated as a result of the manner in which the
evidence supporting the conviction had been obtained. 10 Upon re-
hearing, however, the Court of Appeals vacated its prior decision
and affirmed the petitioner's sentence.1 The Michigan Supreme
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id at 77-78.
8. Id at 78.
9. Id at 77. The Oakland Circuit Court sentenced the petitioner to a mandatory
term of life imprisonment as a result of the cocaine conviction. Id. For the felony-firearm
conviction, the petitioner received a two-year prison sentence. Id.
10. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2684. The Michigan Court of Appeals initially determined
that under the search-and-seizure provisions of the Michigan Constitution, a driver in the
petitioner's situation must be provided with more protection from unreasonable search and
seizure than that which is given by the Fourth Amendment. Harmelin, 440 NW2d at 78.
The court of appeals then held that a driver who has been stopped for a traffic violation
cannot be ordered to get out of his car "unless the officer had a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the driver committed, or was about to commit, a crime." Id.
11. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2684. In his appeal, the petitioner contended that his con-
viction should be reversed because the evidence was acquired as a result of an unconstitu-
tional search and seizure of his person and an unconstitutional search and seizure of his
vehicle. Harmelin, 440 NW2d at 77. Additionally, the petitioner argued that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel. Id. Finally, he contended that a mandatory life sentence
without the possibility of parole was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, and thus he should be resentenced. Id.
The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the Michigan Constitution's search and
seizure provisions could not protect the petitioner because they specifically stated that evi-
dence of any narcotic drug seized outside the curtilage of a dwelling house shall not be
barred from evidence in a criminal proceeding. Id at 78. The petitioner's argument was un-
successful under federal law as the court cited Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106 (1977),
for the proposition that it is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to
order a driver to get out of his car upon being stopped for a traffic violation notwithstanding
that the officer has no suspicion of foul play at the time. Harmelin, 440 NW2d at 76, 78.
The trial court denied the petitioner's pretrial motion for suppression of evidence in
which he contended that the pat-down search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Id at
79. Concluding that the judgment of the lower court was not clearly erroneous, the court of
appeals found no reason to overturn the trial court's ruling. Id.
The court addressed several other issues introduced by the petitioner in his appeal. Id at
79-80. The court ruled that the officer questioning the petitioner about an object which he
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Court denied leave to appeal, and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 12 Before the United States Supreme
Court, the petitioner contended that his mandatory sentence of life
in prison without possibility of parole was unconstitutional for two
reasons.'3 He first claimed that his sentence was "cruel and un-
usual"'14 because it was "significantly disproportionate" to the of-
fense which he committed. 5 Second, the petitioner contended that
his rights under the Eighth Amendment were violated because the
sentence he received was mandatory and thus was imposed by the
judge without taking into account any mitigating factors related to
the crime or the criminal.' 6
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, 7 began his analysis of the
petitioner's first claim by stating that the Eighth Amendment does
not contain a proportionality requirement and, consequently, the
Court overruled its prior 1983 decision in Solem v Helm.'8 The
felt in the petitioner's chest pocket was not equivalent to compelling the petitioner to testify
against himself. Id at 79. Second, the court held that the petitioner's Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated by the warrantless search of his impounded car. Id. Third, the peti-
tioner also failed in his claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and the
right to plead not guilty as the court reasoned that counsel's strategy was targeted to the
petitioner's best chance of acquittal. Id at 80. Finally, the court disagreed with the peti-
tioner's contention that his mandatory sentence was disproportionate to the seriousness of
his offense and was thus a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments. Id.
12. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2684.
13. Id.
14. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." US Const, Amend VIII.
15. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2684.
16. Id.
17. Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of
the Court with respect to the petitioner's claim that his mandatory sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment because certain mitigating factors were not considered. Id at 2683.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined in this part of
the opinion. Id. Justice Scalia's opinion with respect to the petitioner's other contention
that the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality guarantee was joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist. Id. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, filed an opin-
ion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Id. Justice White was joined by
Justices Blackmun and Stevens in his dissenting opinion. Id. Justice Marshall filed a sepa-
rate dissenting opinion. Id. Finally, Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which he
was joined by Justice Blackmun. Id. Thus the Michigan Court of Appeals was affirmed by a
vote of 5-4. Id.
18. Id at 2686. In Solem v Helm, 463 US 277 (1983), the Court upheld an Eighth
Amendment challenge of disproportionality against a South Dakota recidivist (habitual
criminal) statute under which the defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment with
no possibility of parole. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2685. In Solem, the defendant had been
convicted of six prior offenses which included: three third-degree burglary convictions, ob-
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Court in Solem grounded its reasoning upon the contention that a
proportionality guarantee could be found in the "cruell and unusu-
all Punishments" clause of the English Declaration of Rights of
1689's which was subsequently used as the model for the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.20 However, al-
though the English Declaration of Rights did prohibit "cruell and
unusuall Punishments," it did not explicitly forbid punishments
which were "disproportionate" or "excessive. "21 The Court de-
clared that the Solem court assumed, without analysis, that the
latter were included in the former.22 The Court concluded "that
Solem was simply wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains no pro-
portionality guarantee."23
The Court next examined the historical setting in which the En-
glish Declaration of Rights was adopted in order to determine the
meaning of the "cruell and unusuall Punishments" clause of the
English Declaration. 24 The Court found it widely accepted that
this provision was adopted as a response to the manner in which
Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys handed down punishments from the
King's Bench during the "Bloody Assizes. ' ' 25 The Court relied on
taining money by false pretenses, grand larceny, and a third-offense driving while intoxi-
cated conviction. Id. The seventh conviction, which consequently permitted prosecution
under the state's recidivist statute, was for writing a "no account" check with the intent to
defraud. Id. See notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
19. The English Declaration of Rights (the model for our Eighth Amendment) stated
"[t]hat excessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and
unusuall Punishments inflicted." Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2687.
20. Id at 2686.
21. Id at 2687.
22. Id. The Court pointed out that although it is possible that a disproportionate
punishment may always be considered "cruel," it may not always be deemed "unusual." Id.
23. Id. The Court explained further by stating that,
it should be apparent from the above discussion that our 5-to-4 decision eight years
ago in Solem was scarcely the expression of clear and well accepted constitutional
law. We have long recognized, of course, that the doctrine of stare decisis is less rigid
in its application to constitutional precedents, (citations omitted), and we think that
to be especially true of a constitutional precedent that is both recent and in apparent
tension with other decisions. Accordingly, we have addressed anew, and in greater
detail, the question whether the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality guar-
antee-with particular attention to the background of the Eighth Amendment (which
Solem discussed in only two pages, see 463 US, at 284-286, 103 S Ct, at 3006-3007)
and to the understanding of the Eighth Amendment before the end of the 19th cen-
tury (which Solem discussed not at all)."
Id at 2686.
24. Id at 2687-91.
25. Id at 2687. Jeffreys presided over a special Commission which executed hundreds
of rebels following the Duke of Monmouth's uprising in 1685. Id. It is believed that Jeffreys'
practice of imposing arbitrary sentences which were not sanctioned by common law prece-
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the Titus Oates case to confirm that the focus of the prohibition
against "cruell and unusuall Punishments" was the illegal nature
of the Chief Justice's activities, not the disproportionality of his
sentences.26 The Court learned that it was not uncommon for Chief
Justice Jeffreys to impose punishments which were not sanctioned
by either statute or common law (i.e., illegal punishments).17 Addi-
tionally, in the legal community at the time, the words "illegall"
and "unusuall" had the same meaning when used in reference to
punishments imposed by the Crown. s Therefore, the Court found
it unlikely that the "cruell and unusuall Punishments" provision of
the Declaration of Rights was intended to bar "disproportionate"
punishments.29
The Court recognized that the critical determination, however,
was not what "cruell and unusuall Punishments" signified to the
English, but the meaning it held for those who incorporated that
language into the Eighth Amendment." The Court stated that ac-
cording to the 1828 edition of Webster's Dictionary, "unusual"
meant, and still means, "such as [does not] occu[r] in ordinary
practice."'" Thus, certain modes of punishment which are not nor-
mally implemented are prohibited by this provision.2
The Court provided three arguments against interpreting the
prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments" as a guarantee of
proportional sentencing with respect to a particular offense." The
Court first contended that if the "cruel and unusual punishments"
dent or statute is what prompted the language in the English Declaration of Rights. Id at
2688.
26. Id. This is evidenced by examining the dissents of a minority of Lords in the case
of Titus Oates (convicted before the King's Bench of perjury) in which Oates was sentenced
to be fined, whipped, and "stript of [his] Canonical Habits." Id at 2688-89. The Lords stated
that such a judgment was incorrect and should be reversed because it was "contrary to Law
and ancient Practice." Id at 2689.
27. Id at 2688.
28. Id at 2690.
29. Id at 2691.
30. Id.
31. Id. The Court cited In re Kemmler, 136 US 436, 446-47 (1890), for the proposi-
tion that the "cruel and unusual punishments" provision prohibits the legislature from sanc-
tioning particular modes of punishment, particularly those which are cruel and not com-
monly imposed. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2691. The petitioner in In re Kemmler was convicted
of first-degree murder and sentenced to death by electrocution. In re Kemmler, 136 US at
439, 441. The Court held that the mode of punishment (i.e., death by electrocution) was not
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual since the evidence demonstrated that death in this
manner would be instant and painless. Id at 443. See notes 76-79 and accompanying text for
further discussion of In re Kemmler.
32. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2691.
33. Id at 2692-93.
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provision had been intended to include a proportionality require-
ment, it is unlikely that the Framers would have used such vague
terms as "cruel and unusual. 3 4 Secondly, the Court found it quite
odd that cruelty and unusualness with respect to a particular of-
fense would have been the intended meaning of a provision apply-
ing to a new government which as yet had not defined any of-
fenses.3 5 Finally, the Court believed that the available information
evidencing contemporary understanding at that time indicated
that the criteria of "cruel and unusual" was to be determined irre-
spective of reference to any particular offense. s
The Court next considered the three factors which in Solem
were found to be useful in assessing proportionality.3 7 The Court
ultimately concluded that the three enumerated factors did not
present a workable method for determining proportionality.38
Although proportionality is a consideration when the death pen-
alty may be imposed, the Court cited several cases regarding pun-
ishment by death as special situations which warrant additional
constitutional protections.3 9 Thus, the Court believed that death
penalty cases cannot be used as a justification for an Eighth
Amendment guarantee of proportionality.40
The petitioner's second challenge to the Eighth Amendment
rested upon the argument that it was "cruel and unusual" to im-
pose such a severe mandatory sentence without consideration of
34. Id at 2692. The concept of proportionality was not a new one, as several states
had proportionality provisions in their constitutions. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that if
proportionality was to be guaranteed, it would have been stated in direct, clear terms. Id.
35. Id at 2693.
36. Id. Both the actions of the First Congress and the initial commentary on the
clause provided no indication that a proportionality requirement was intended. Id at 2694.
Additionally, the danger that a proportionality requirement would ultimately lead to a sub-
jective imposition of values in the sentencing process provide added support that such was
not the original intention behind the clause. Id at 2697.
37. Id. The Court, citing Solem, 463 US at 290-91, summarized these factors as fol-
lows: "(1) the inherent gravity of the offense, (2) the sentences imposed for similarly grave
offenses in the same jurisdiction, and (3) sentences imposed for the same crime in other
jurisdictions." Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2697.
38. Id at 2698-99. With regard to the gravity of the offense, as mentioned in factors
(1) and (2) in note 37, the Court reasoned that since there is no objective standard for
gravity, judges would be left with deciding and comparing what they perceive as being
grave. Id at 2698. The Court found that the third factor as stated in Solem, although it can
be applied easily, is not relevant to the Eighth Amendment as it is up to the individual
states to punish crimes at their discretion. Id.
39. Id at 2701. The Court cited Turner v Murray, 476 US 28, 36-37 (1986), Eddings v
Oklahoma, 455 US 104 (1982), and Beck v Alabama, 447 US 625 (1980). Harmelin, 111 S Ct
at 2701.
40. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2701.
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any mitigating factors.4 The Court, however, declared that this
was not supported by either the text or the history of the Eighth
Amendment.42 Additionally, the petitioner contended that the
principles of the "individualized capital-sentencing doctrine ' 43
should be applied to the case of a mandatory sentence of life in
prison to allow for the consideration of certain mitigating factors."
Again emphasizing that death is fundamentally different from all
other penalties, the Court similarly rejected the petitioner's second
claim.4" The Court concluded that because of the fundamental dif-
ference between death and all other penalties, the "individualized
capital-sentencing" doctrine cannot be applied outside the context
of capital crimes. 46 The Court thus affirmed the decision of the
Michigan Court of Appeals and upheld the petitioner's sentence.
417
Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice O'Connor and Justice Sou-
ter joined, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.48 Jus-
tice Kennedy argued that the Eighth Amendment does in fact con-
tain a proportionality guarantee. 49 However, that guarantee is not
one of strict proportionality between the crime and the sentence,
but prohibits only extreme sentences that are "grossly dispropor-
tionate" to the crime.5 ° Justice Kennedy concluded that due to the
severity of the offense in this case, the sentence imposed was not
41. Id. Harmelin contended that the fact that he had no prior felony convictions
should have been considered before sentencing him to life in prison without the possibility
of parole. Id.
42. Id. Mandatory penalties have been imposed throughout the history of this coun-
try, and although a mandatory penalty may be cruel, it is not unusual. Id.
43. This doctrine, which allows individualized determination of the appropriateness
of the imposition of the death penalty, can be found in Sumner v Shuman, 483 US 66, 73
(1987). Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2701-02. While serving a life sentence in a Nevada prison,
Shuman killed a fellow inmate and was convicted of capital murder. Sumner, 483 US at 67.
His conviction carried a mandatory sentence of death. Id. The question addressed by the
Court was whether a statute which carries a mandatory sentence of death for a prison in-
mate convicted of murder while serving a life sentence without possibility of parole is con-
stitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. The Court held that such a
statute was unconstitutional and that individualized sentencing procedures must be used in
this capital case. Id at 85.





49. Id at 2705.
50. Id. Justice Kennedy cited Solem, 463 US at 288, 303, for this proposition. Harme-
lin, 111 S Ct 2705. Justice Kennedy considered four factors in making this conclusion: (1)
legislative discretion in establishing punishments, (2) the variety of valid punishment theo-
ries, (3) the nature of the federal system which results in diverse sentences, and (4) the need
for objective factors in proportionality review. Id at 2703-06.
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unconstitutional.5 1 Additionally, Justice Kennedy reasoned that
the Michigan legislature's punishment scheme was constitutional,
as the legislature had the authority to exercise its discretion in ad-
dressing the issue of drug possession.52
In a dissenting opinion, Justice White argued that since the
Eighth Amendment forbids "excessive" fines, it could be construed
to require a consideration of the proportionality of the fine levied
as compared to the crime committed.5 3 Justice White then re-
sponded to the majority's three arguments that the Eighth Amend-
ment contains no proportionality guarantee.5 4 The dissent also ad-
dressed the majority's concern that the three factors suggested by
the Solem Court 55 would lead to the use of subjective imposition of
criminal sentences.
56
The dissent outlined two possible risks inherent in the majority's
opinion.5 7 First, Justice White contended that the majority did not
provide an adequate procedure to deal with an extreme situation
in which the punishment is one which no rational person could ac-
51. Id at 2707. Justice Kennedy suggested that of the factors explained in Solem, see
note 37, the only one that may be needed is the initial comparison of the gravity of the
offense with the severity of the sentence. Id. Comparing the petitioner's sentence with those
both within and outside of the jurisdiction should serve only to substantiate the original
determination that the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the offense. Id.
52. Id at 2709. Justice Kennedy stated that the punishment scheme was the product
of careful deliberation to deal with the problem which drugs present in our society. Id at
2708. The purpose of deterrence was achieved since the statute provided clear notice of the
consequences of the forbidden criminal act. Id. Additionally, unjust sentences can be
avoided through the use of prosecutorial discretion, or they can be corrected by legislative
clemency. Id at 2709.
53. Id.
54. Id at 2710. The majority argued that if proportionality was the intent of the
Framers, they would have clearly stated that principle, but Justice White pointed out simi-
lar instances where the Framers were not clear in their choice of language such as the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures which is guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Id. Justice White countered
the argument that the country at the time had not defined any offenses by noting that the
established criminal justice systems in the states would have provided numerous examples
from which to determine unusualness. Id. Finally, Justice White contended that available
evidence at the time of ratification cannot be construed to find an intention on the part of
the Framers to completely preclude the concept of proportionality. Id.
55. For the three factors utilized in Solem, see note 37.
56. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2712. Justice White stated that, in practice, the applica-
tion of the factors has been relatively simple as well as successful. Id. Only four cases de-
cided subsequent to Solem were cited in which a sentence was reversed pursuant to an
analysis based on proportionality: Clowers v State, 522 S2d 762 (Miss 1988); Ashley v State,
538 S2d 1181 (Miss 1989); State v Gilham, 48 Ohio App 3d 293, 549 NE2d 555 (1988); and
Naovarath v State, 105 Nev 525, 779 P2d 944 (1989). Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2713 n 2.
57. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2714.
394
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cept because it is completely disproportionate to the crime.58 Sec-
ond, the Justice believed that the majority's interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment as prohibiting only certain modes of punish-
ment cannot easily be reconciled with the fact that capital punish-
ment cases do not prohibit the use of death as a mode of punish-
ment, but instead place limits upon its implementation. 9
Justice White argued that the factors announced in Solem6"
should be applied to determine if the sentence was proportional to
the offense, ultimately deciding that the petitioner's sentence was
not proportional to the offense."' He concluded that the punish-
ment must fail under an Eighth Amendment challenge.
6 1
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall stated that,
although he agreed with the dissent of Justice White, he would
hold capital punishment unconstitutional in every situation.3.
In a third dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Blackmun, agreed "wholeheartedly" with Justice White's dissent
but commented further concerning the petitioner's sentence, ulti-
mately contending that the sentence was "capricious."64 Justice
58. Id. Justice White was not satisfied with the majority's claim -that such extreme
situations are not likely to occur, realizing that if they did, there would be no basis for
deciding such a case. Id.
59. Id.
60. The Solem factors are set forth in note 37. See also notes 55-56 and accompany-
ing text.
61. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2714, 2719. Justice White, in applying the first factor an-
nounced in Solem, considered the nature of the offense, the petitioner's personal responsi-
bility and the practical results of its application, and concluded that the gravity of the of-
fense committed was not proportional to the harshness of the punishment. Id at 2716-18.
Next, after comparing the sentences imposed on other criminals in Michigan as well as those
rendered in other jurisdictions for the same offense, Justice White concluded that the
mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole for violation of a Michigan
statute prohibiting drug possession was cruel and unusual and thus violated the Eighth
Amendment. Id at 2718-19.
62. Id at 2714.
63. Id at 2719. Justice Marshall said, "The Eighth Amendment requires comparative
proportionality review of capital sentences. (citation omitted) However, my view that capital
punishment is especially proscribed and, where not proscribed, especially restricted by the
Eighth Amendment is not inconsistent with Justice White's central conclusion. . . that the
Eighth Amendment also imposes a general proportionality requirement." Id.
64. Id at 2719-20. Stevens stated that a sentence of death and one of mandatory life
in prison without possibility of parole share a common trait in that the offender will never
be free. Id. Such a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole must rest on the
assumption that the interest of the offender in being rehabilitated is outweighed by society's
interests in deterrence and retribution. Id at 2719, citing Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238,
307 (Stewart concurring) (1977). The Justice commented that it would be unreasonable to
assume that every offender convicted under the Michigan statute at issue in this case is
unable to be rehabilitated and thus should receive this mandatory sentence. Id at 2720. He
concluded by noting that Michigan is the only jurisdiction that places this offense in such a
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Stevens explained that the petitioner's sentence would "barely ex-
ceed 10 years" under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and in
most states he would have received a "substantially shorter" sen-
tence as a first-time offender.
6 5
The "cruel and unusual punishments" clause of the Eighth
Amendment 66 had as its model the English Bill of Rights of 1689.67
A like provision was also included in the Virginia Declaration of
Rights of 1776.68 The clause was not placed in the text of the Con-
stitution, and the intent of the Framers to include it in the Bill of
Rights is not easily ascertained.69 It is unlikely, however, that the
Framers were only concerned with preventing torturous punish-
ments.70 Their interest in limiting Congress' power over punish-
ment grew out of the realization that the broad legislative discre-
tion in the field of punishments must be checked. 71 However, even
though it can be determined why the Framers believed the Eighth
Amendment was necessary, it is not possible to know precisely
what they meant by the prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishments.
'72
One of earliest cases which addressed the issue of cruel and un-
category which assumes that the possibility of rehabilitation does not exist. Id.
65. Id.
66. See note 14 for the text of the Eight Amendment.
67. Note, Solitary Confinement: Legal and Psychological Considerations, 15 New
Eng J on Crim & Civ Confinement 301, 305 (1989), citing Leonard Orland, Prisons: Houses
of Darkness at 84-91 (Free Press, 1975). The purpose of the English Bill of Rights was to
prohibit the prevalent forms of punishment which were both "barbarous and torturous."
Note, 15 New Eng J on Crim & Civ Confinement at 306, citing Orland, Prisons: Houses of
Darkness at 85 (cited in this note).
68. Id. Additionally, the Declaration of Rights of Delaware, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, and New Hampshire had similar provisions. Id.
69. Furman, 408 US at 258 (Brennan concurring). The only evidence of the Frarpers'
intent can be found in the debates which took place during the ratifying conventions of two
states. Id. Mr. Holmes of Massachusdtts voiced his concern that Congress was not "re-
strained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments" for crimes. Id at 258-
59, citing 2 J. Elliot's Debates 111 (2d ed 1876). In Virginia, Patrick Henry declared that in
the area of punishments, "no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of
representatives." Furman, 408 US at 259 (Brennan concurring), citing 3 J. Elliot's Debates
at 447 (cited within this note). Henry also spoke of "tortures, or cruel and barbarous pun-
ishment." Furman, 408 US at 260, citing 3 J. Elliot's Debates at 447 (Brennan concurring).
70. Furman, 408 US at 260 (Brennan concurring).
71. Id at 260-61. A "constitutional check" was thought to be necessary to guarantee
that, "no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives," in
dealing with punishments. Id at 261.
72. Id at 263. It can be concluded that torturous punishments were definitely in-
tended to be prohibited, but the evidence does not indicate that "only torturous punish-
ments were to be outlawed." Id.
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usual punishment was Wilkerson v Utah.73 Wilkerson was ad-
judged guilty of murder in the first degree and subsequently sen-
tenced to death with the instruction that death be accomplished
by shooting.74 The Court acknowledged that cruel and unusual
punishments were prohibited by the Constitution, but ultimately
determined that death by shooting as punishment for the convic-
tion of first degree murder was not forbidden by the clause.
75
The issue of the Eighth Amendment as it applied to the mode of
punishment was again addressed in In re Kemmler.76 Kemmler
was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death by
electrocution. 77 Kemmler argued that death by the use of electric-
ity was a cruel and unusual punishment and thus prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment.7 The Court, however, disagreed and
found that the mode of punishment prescribed was not
unconstitutional.79
In 1910, the United States Supreme Court for the first time in
Weems v US 0 extensively analyzed the Eighth Amendment with
an emphasis upon the Framers' intent.8 ' The petitioner, an officer
73. 99 US 130 (1879), overruled by Gregg v Georgia, 428 US 153 (1976).
74. Wilkerson, 99 US at 130-31. The law of the Territory of Utah at the time pro-
vided that anyone convicted of first degree murder should suffer death. Id at 132. No other
statutory regulation existed which specifically referred to an allowable mode of punishment,
except that the Revised Penal Code, Section 10 placed a duty upon the sentencing court to
determine and authorize the punishments prescribed in the other code sections. Id.
75. Id at 134-35. The Court briefly referred to certain other modes of punishment
utilized throughout history. Id at 135. In a reference to Blackstone, the Court mentioned
that the sentences for certain atrocioud crimes sometimes called for the prisoner to be em-
boweled alive, beheaded, and quartered; dragged to the site of the execution; or burned
alive. Id. However, often the parts of these judgments which involved torture or cruelty were
not strictly enforced. Id. Recognizing that the precise scope of the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause could not be determined, the Court at least was confident in stating that pun-
ishments which were torturous and unnecessarily cruel, such as those mentioned above,
were prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id at 135-36.
76. 136 US 436 (1890), overruled by Gregg v Georgia, 428 US 153 (1976).
77. Kemmler, 136 US at 439, 441.
78. Id at 441.
79. Id at 443. The Supreme Court held that the lower court did not commit an error
when it presumed that the state legislature in enacting the New York statute authorizing
death by electrocution had collected all the facts necessary to conclude that death by elec-
trocution was not a cruel and unusual punishment. Id at 443, 449. Although electrocution
was a new mode of punishment and thus unusual, it was not seen as cruel since there was a
substantial amount of evidence which clearly demonstrated that a substantial electric cur-
rent could be generated which would result in instant, painless death. Id at 443. The Court
also identified various modes of punishment which would be viewed as "manifestly. cruel
and unusual" and thus within the constitutional prohibition, including burning at the stake,
crucifixion, and breaking on the wheel. Id at 446.
80. 217 US 349 (1910).
81. Note, Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment - Rummel, Solem, and the
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of the Bureau of Coast Guard and Transportation of the United
States Government of the Philippine Islands, was found guilty of
falsifying a public and official document.2 The punishment for
such an offense was established as cadena temporal83 which was
prescribed by the Penal Code of Spain."4 The petitioner objected
to his sentence of 15 years, contending that such punishment was
prohibited by the Bill of Rights of the Philippine Islands which
forbade the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.8 5
The Court examined the history of the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause, commenting on various debates which occurred
during specific state conventions.8 6 The arguments of James Wil-
son made during the Pennsylvania Convention and those of Pat-
rick Henry set forth at the Virginia Convention were contrasted. 7
Wilson concluded that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary and exhib-
ited confidence that the legislature would uphold and not infringe
upon the spirit of liberty.8 Henry was not as optimistic and as-
sumed a position in which he advocated a basic distrust of power,
concluding that constitutional restraints were necessary to guard
against abuse of power.8 9 The Court in Weems, however, hypothe-
sized that these men certainly did not intend to prohibit only the
modes of cruel and unusual punishment which throughout history
Venerable Case of Weems v United States, 1984 Duke L J 789, 798 (1984).
82. Weems, 217 US at 357, 363. The actual violation occurred when he entered in the
cash book that certain sums were paid to employees of the lighthouse service when, in fact,
they were not paid. Id.
83. Id. Only two types of punishment ranked higher on the scale than cadena tempo-
ral - death and cadena perpetua. Id at 364. Cadena temporal required that the offender be
fined and then imprisoned for a length of time between twelve years and one day to twenty
years. Id at 363-64. Those sentenced were required to wear chains upon both their wrists
and ankles and to endure hard and painful labor for the benefit of the state. Id at 364.
Additionally, accessory penalties included deprivation of parental authority, guardianship of
person or property, and marital authority during the time of punishment. Id. The offender
was also subject to surveillance by the authorities. Id. It was required that those punished
fix a domicil, observe certain rules of inspection, and "adopt some trade, art, industry, or
profession." Id. The final accessory penalty was the denial of the right to vote and hold
pubic office. Id at 364-65.
84. Id at 363.
85. Id at 365.
86. Id at 368, 372. What was considered cruel and unusual had not been specifically
decided. Id at 368. The Court examined the principles announced in Wilkerson v Utah (see
note 73 and accompanying text) and In re Kemmler (see note 76 and accompanying text) in
which it was found that death by shooting (Wilkerson) and death by electrocution (Kern-
ruler) were not cruel and unusual modes of punishment and, therefore, did not violate the
Eighth Amendment. Id at 369-71.





gave rise to the Eighth Amendment prohibition.90 The Court rea-
soned that, in accordance with the intent of the Framers of the
Eighth Amendment, a certain power was provided to the judiciary
to decide what constituted cruel and unusual punishment.91 The
Court examined other legislation of the Philippine Commission
and discovered that the punishment for counterfeiting or forgery
of the obligations or securities of the United States or the Philip-
pine Islands was set at "not more than 10,000 pesos and imprison-
ment of not more than fifteen years." 92 The Court, in comparing
this punishment with that given to Weems for falsifying one item
of a public account, found that the former was no greater than the
latter.9 ' The Court reasoned that this similarity exhibited a con-
trast "between unrestrained power and that which is exercised
under the spirit of constitutional limitations formed to establish
justice."9 4 Thus, the Court concluded that the punishment im-
posed upon Weems was cruel and unusual and, therefore, violated
the Eighth Amendment.9
In Trop v Dulles,"6 the Court again was confronted with a chal-
lenge to the Eighth Amendment.9 7 Trop was a native-born Ameri-
can who was deprived of his United States citizenship as a result of
his conviction in a court-martial proceeding for desertion during
wartime.9 8 The Court held that an individual's right of citizenship
90. Id. The Court believed that the Framers must have realized that cruelty could be
inflicted by application of laws other than those which authorized bodily pain or mutilation.
Id.
91. Note, 1984 Duke L J at 802 (cited in note 81).
92. Weems, 217 US at 380-81.
93. Id at 381.
94. Id.
95. Id at 382. Justice White authored a dissent in which he disagreed with the major-
ity's interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishments clause. Id at 385. He observed
that the legislative power of Congress to define and punish crime was limited by the right of
the judiciary to oversee the exercise of that power. Id. Justice White viewed the word
"cruel" as restricting the legislature from imposing punishments which would result in un-
necessary bodily suffering by employing inhumane methods for bringing about bodily tor-
ture. Id at 409. Thus, he interpreted the Eighth Amendment as guarding against those
methods of punishment frequently used prior to the English Bill of Rights of 1689. Id. He
further believed that the use of the term "unusual" prohibited the imposition of punish-
ments which were deemed illegal. Id at 409-10.
96. 356 US 86 (1958).
97. Trop, 356 US at 99.
98. Id at 87. Trop had been confined to the stockade for an earlier disciplinary in-
fraction when he escaped. Id. He was absent for less than a day when he voluntarily surren-
dered to an officer in an Army vehicle whom he met on his way back to the base. Id. Trop
was convicted of desertion in a court-martial proceeding and sentenced to three years of
hard labor, relinquishment of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. Id at 88.
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cannot be taken away unless the individual voluntarily renounces
or abandons this right, and thus decided that this alone would pro-
vide the basis for reversal since the petitioner had done neither.99
The Court went on to pose the question of whether the Constitu-
tion allowed Congress to take away citizenship for the purpose of
punishing a crime.'00 The Court considered whether denationaliza-
tion pursuant to the statute was cruel and unusual and thus viola-
tive of the Eighth Amendment guarantee. 101 Declaring that "[t]he
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" the Court
held that punishment by denationalization was cruel and unusual
and was, therefore, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 02 2
In 1977, the Court in Coker v Georgia'0 3 reversed a Georgia Su-
preme Court decision which held that the imposition of the death
penalty as a punishment for a rape conviction did not violate the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
0 4
The Court believed that it was unnecessary to reiterate the key
aspects of the controversy about capital punishment and its consti-
tutionality, and, therefore, stated the accepted principle that the
punishment of death was not an "inherently barbaric or an unac-
ceptable mode of punishment" for a crime and that it was not au-
tomatically disproportionate when compared to the crime for
which it was rendered.
05
The Coker Court focused on various principles which were estab-
Several years after his conviction, he was unable to obtain a passport because he had lost his
citizenship pursuant to Section 401(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940. Id. It was in response
to this inability to obtain a passport that Trop commenced this suit seeking a declaratory
judgment that he was a citizen. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's grant of a
motion for summary judgment in favor of the government. Id at 104.
99. Id at 93. The Court also determined that there was no other legitimate purpose
supporting the statute other than to punish the offender. Id at 97. Thus, the Court con-
cluded that the statute was a penal law. Id.
100. Id at 99.
101. Id.
102. Id at 101. The majority stated that although denationalization involved no physi-
cal mistreatment or torture, it did ultimately result in the complete loss of the individual's
status in society. Id. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent, however, distinguished denationali-
zation from punishment. Id at 124. Justice Frankfurter argued that even though loss of
citizenship likely resulted in severe consequences, it was not "punishment" for purposes of
the Constitution. Id.
103. 433 US 584 (1977).
104. Coker, 433 US at 586. The petitioner was convicted of rape and received the
death penalty pursuant to Ga Code Ann § 26-2001 (1972), which provided that "[a] person
convicted of rape shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life, or by imprison-
ment for not less than one nor more than 20 years." Id.
105. Coker, 433 US at 591.
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lished in its opinion in Gregg v Georgia,1 06 and concluded that the
death penalty was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment from be-
ing utilized as punishment for the crime of rape.10 7 Studying the
objective evidence'"8 relevant to the country's opinion concerning
the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape of an
adult woman, the court discovered that Georgia was the only juris-
diction at the time which imposed the death sentence in such an
instance 09
In Rummel v Estelle,"0 the Court was again met with a propor-
tionality challenge to the Eighth Amendment."' The petitioner,
Rummel, was sentenced to life imprisonment in accordance with a
Texas recidivist statute." 2 Having no success in the Texas appel-
106. 428 US 153 (1976).
107. Coker, 433 US at 592. The Court noted that according to Gregg, a punishment is
excessive in comparison to the crime committed and thus barred as unconstitutional if it (1)
does not further the acceptable goal of the punishment or (2) is grossly disproportionate
when compared with the crime's severity. Id. Additionally, judgments rendered under the
Eighth Amendment must not reflect only the Justices' subjective views but must also be
substantiated by objective factors. Id. In ascertaining the objective factors, the attitude of
the public with respect to a specific sentence must be considered. Id.
108. Id at 593-96. The Court examined the enactment of death penalty statutes across
the country and determined that while Georgia was the only state which authorized the
death penalty for rape of an adult woman, both Florida and Mississippi provided capital
punishment for the rape of a child. Id.
109. Id at 593, 595-96. Therefore, the Court's own judgment that the death penalty
was a disproportionate punishment for the crime of rape of an adult woman was supported
by this extrajurisdictional evidence. Id at 597. The Court did not wish to minimize the seri-
ousness of the crime of rape, but emphasized that. . . .when compared to . . . murder in
which a life is lost, rape by definition does not result in death or serious injury. Id at 598.
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. Id at 601. He
agreed that, although the death penalty is usually a disproportionate punishment for the
crime of raping an adult woman, it is not always a disproportionate penalty for this crime.
Id. Justice Powell suggested that in examining the objective indicators of society's views
regarding rape, it would be possible to show that the death penalty may not be considered
disproportionate for a rape which, for example, involved brutality or severe injury. Id at 604.
Justice Burger dissented, stating that although he agreed that the death penalty would be
disproportionate for minor crimes, rape was not such a crime. Id. Therefore, he advocated
review of the facts and circumstances on a case-by-case basis in order to determine if the
particular rape warranted punishment by the death penalty. Id at 607. Justice Burger feared
that it could be implied from the majority's holding that the death penalty may only be
imposed in crimes which ultimately resulted in the victim's death. Id at 621. He concluded
that this is an area in which the states should be permitted to legislate. Id at 622.
110. 445 US 263 (1980).
111. Rummel, 445 US at 265.
112. Id at 264. The Texas statute required that anyone convicted three times of a
felony less than a capital offense shall be-sentenced to life in prison following the third such
conviction. Id. Rummel was first charged with fraudulent use of a credit card by which he
acquired $80 worth of goods'or services. Id at 265. Credit card fraud was a felony punishable
by two to ten years if the amount involved was more than $50. Rummel pleaded guilty and
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late courts, Rummel then filed a petition for habeas corpus" 3 in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
in which he argued that his life sentence was an unconstitutionally
cruel and unusual punishment because it was disproportionate to
the crimes which he committed." 4 The district court rejected his
arguments, noting that the sentence was not technically one of life
imprisonment because in approximately twelve years, he would
have been eligible for parole." 5 The court of appeals initially re-
versed, agreeing with the disproportionality claim, but upon re-
hearing, the court vacated its prior judgment emphasizing the peti-
tioner's possibility of parole within twelve years of confinement." 6
The main contention of the petitioner in the Supreme Court of
the United States was that the state did not have the authority to
impose a life sentence for his third felony, a crime punishable only
by a term of years. 17 The Court recognized that the Eighth
Amendment had in the past been invoked to prohibit a dispropor-
tionate sentence when compared with the underlying crime." s The
Court closely examined Weems v United States"9 because it in-
volved an Eighth Amendment challenge outside of the arena of
capital punishment. 2 0  The Court ultimately concluded that
Weems could not be relied upon outside of the context of its par-
was sentenced to three years in a state penitentiary. Id.
Five years later, Rummel pleaded guilty to passing a forged check in the amount $28.36
for which he was sentenced to four years imprisonment. Id at 265-66.
In his third felony conviction, Rummel was charged with felony theft in obtaining $120.75
by false pretenses. Id at 266. For this third felony, however, Rummel was prosecuted under
the Texas recidivist statute. Id. A jury convicted the petitioner of felony theft and also
confirmed his two prior felony convictions, and he was ultimately sentenced to life in prison
under the recidivist statute. Id.
113. Habeas corpus in this context means "[a] writ directed to the person detaining
another, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner, or person detained."
The purpose of this writ is "to test the legality of the detention or imprisonment; not
whether he is guilty or innocent." Black's Law Dictionary 638 (West, 5th ed 1979).
114. Rummel, 445 US at 267.
115. Id.
116. Id at 267-68.
117. Id at 270-71.
118. Id at 271. However, the Court noted that a number of disproportionality charges
had appeared in the context of the death penalty. Id at 272. Contending that the sentence of
death was different in kind from one of imprisonment, the court reasoned that capital pun-
ishment cases would be little help in Rummel's case where life imprisonment was the issue.
Id.
119. 217 US 349 (1910). See notes 80-95 and accompanying text for full discussion of
Weems v United States.
120. Rummel, 445 US at 272.
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ticular facts.121 Therefore, the Court concluded that the length of
sentences for crimes which are classified as felonies and thus pun-
ishable by substantial terms of imprisonment are subject solely to
"legislative prerogative."' 22 This view ultimately led to the Court's
reluctance to review terms of imprisonment mandated by state
legislatures.'
2 3
Rummel compared the Texas recidivist program with those of
other states and concluded that with the exception of two states,
West Virginia and Washington, he would have received a lesser
penalty everywhere else in the United States. 24 However, the
Court rejected this reasoning and declared that some states would
always be known for imposing harsher punishments upon certain
offenders than other states.125 The Court recognized that the goals
of a recidivist statute are to deter repeat offenders and to segregate
such offenders from society at some point in their life following a
predetermined number of offenses.126 The Court concluded that
the point at which a repeat offender should be separated from soci-
ety for an extended period of time as well as the amount of time of
that separation are largely to be determined by the punishing ju-
risdiction. 27 Thus, the Court held that the mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment imposed on Rummel was not a cruel and un-
usual punishment.'
28
121. Id at 274. The Rummel court viewed the surrounding circumstances in Weems as
important. Id. The offense in Weems of falsifying a public and official document was minor,
the minimum prison term of twelve years and one day to twenty years was very long, and
the "accessories" included in the punishment were out of the ordinary. Id. Accessories in-
cluded deprivation of parental authority, guardianship of personal property, and marital
authority. Weems, 217 US at 364. The offender was also subject to surveillance by the au-
thorities as well as being denied the right to vote and hold public office. Id at 364-65.
122. Rummel, 445 US at 274.
123. Id.
124. Id at 279.
125. Id at 282.
126. Id at 284.
127. Id at 285.
128. Id. Justice Powell dissented, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan. Id.
In examining the history of the Eighth Amendment, Justice Powell concluded that punish-
ments which in form are barbarous and those which are greatly excessive are cruel and
unusual. Id at 293. If no social purpose is furthered or if the sentence is not proportionate to
the severity of the crime, the sentence may be classified as excessive. Id. Justice Powell
would apply a proportionality analysis to capital as well as noncapital crimes. Id. He con-
tended that three objective factors must be examined in assessing proportionality: (1) the
nature of the offense, (2) the type of sentence which other jurisdictions impose for the same
crime, and (3) the sentence which the same jurisdiction imposes on its other criminals. Id at
295. Justice Powell applied these factors and ultimately concluded that Rummel's punish-
ment was contrary to the proportionality requirement of the cruel and unusual punishments
1992
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Two years later, in Hutto v Davis,129 the Court was again con-
fronted with a proportionality challenge to the Eighth Amend-
ment.130 In a Virginia court, Davis was convicted of possession with
the intent to distribute as well as distribution of marijuana. 131 He
was thereafter sentenced to a prison term of twenty years for each
of the two counts, the terms to run consecutively, 3 2 and required
to pay a $10,000 fine. 3" Davis contended that the forty-year sen-
tence constituted cruel and unusual punishment because it was
grossly disproportionate to the crime. 34 The Court ultimately con-
cluded that Rummel was controlling and thus rejected Davis' pro-
portionality challenge.'35
The Court most recently examined the issue of proportionality
in the case of Solem v Helm.3 6 The Court was confronted with the
issue of whether a life sentence without possibility of parole for a
seventh nonviolent felony was a violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment.13 7 Helm had been convicted in South Dakota of six nonvio-
lent felonies. 38 For the seventh felony, Helm was charged with ut-
tering a "no account" check which carried a maximum punishment
of a $5,000 fine and five years imprisonment. 3 9 Helm's repeated
convictions warranted his prosecution under South Dakota's recid-
ivist statute, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment as a habit-
ual criminal. 40 Helm contended that his sentence resulted in cruel
clause and thus a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id at 303.
129. 454 US 370 (1982).




134. Id. Davis had in his possession a quantity of marijuana which was less than nine
ounces. Id.
135. Id at 374-75. Justice Brennan was joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens
in his dissent. Id at 381. Justice Brennan concluded that this punishment was harsh as well
as cruelly in excess of the punishments which the Virginia courts had imposed on other
offenders convicted of similar crimes. Id at 385. Justice Brennan claimed that such punish-
ment was disproportionate and not substantiated by any judgment of the legislature declar-
ing that the punishment imposed and the crime committed were comparable. Id at 386.
136. 463 US 277 (1983).
137. Solem, 463 US at 279.
138. Id. The six felonies included third-degree burglary (in 1964, 1966, and 1969), ob-
taining money under false pretenses (1972), grand larceny (1973), and a third-offense driv-
ing while intoxicated (1975). Id at 279-80. According to the record, all the offenses were
nonviolent, none were classified as a crime against a person, and in each instance alcohol
was involved. Id at 280.
139. Id at 281.
140. Id at 281-82.
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and unusual punishment.141
The Court began by affirming that the concept of proportional-
ity between the punishment and the crime is apparent throughout
the development of the common law.142 The Court also concluded
that the concept of proportionality was one which had been recog-
nized for nearly one hundred years. 43 Thus, the Court held that a
criminal sentence must be proportionate to the severity of the
crime.""
The Court relied upon three objective factors which should be
reviewed in assessing proportionality. 4 5 After applying the objec-
tive criteria, the Court concluded that Helm was subjected to "the
penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct.' 1 46
The Court held "as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence
must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has
been convicted.' 47 Finding that Helm's sentence was "significantly
disproportionate to his crime," the Court held that it was prohib-
ited by the Eighth Amendment.
48
Harmelin v Michigan is the first.case in which the United States
Supreme Court has addressed the issue of a proportionality guar-
antee in the Eighth Amendment since its decision in Solem v
Helm.4 9 The Harmelin Court decided to examine this issue "anew,
141. Id at 283.
142. Id at 284. The Court examined the language of the English Bill of Rights noting
that it condemned punishments which were severe or excessive. Id at 285. The Framers, by
incorporating the language of the English Bill of Rights into the Eighth Amendment, evi-
denced their intent that American citizens should receive at least this same protection,
which included the right to be free from excessive punishments. Id at 286.
143. Id.
144. Id at 290. Additionally, it was noted that courts should, whenever possible, defer
to legislatures which have the responsibility for fixing the types of crimes and the punish-
ments for those crimes and defer to the trial courts which possess discretion in sentencing
criminals. Id.
145. Id at 290-91. The first factor which the Court contended should be examined was
the gravity of the offense as compared to the harshness of the penalty. Id at 291. Second,
comparison of sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction upon other criminals should oc-
cur. Id. Finally, the Court should consider the sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for
commission of the same offense. Id. The assumptions underlying these factors are that
courts have the ability to judge the relative gravity of an offense as well as the ability to
compare different sentences. Id at 292, 294.
146. Id at 303.
147. Id at 290.
148. Id. In Solem, Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor in his dissent. Id at 304. The Chief Justice contended that the Court's holding in
Solem could not be reconciled with the holding in Rummel, and he therefore dissented be-
cause the Court did not overrule this prior holding. Id.
149. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2685.
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and in greater detail"'150 because of the closeness of the decision in
Solem' 5' as well as the recognized practice which allows a more
relaxed application of stare decisis to constitutional precedents,
especially those that are recent and appear to conflict with other
decisions. 52 The Court carefully studied the background of the
Eighth Amendment as well as the early understanding of it and
consequently determined that Solem was wrong in its conclusion
that the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality guaran-
tee.153 Although the Harmelin Court significantly departs from the
precedent set out by Solem, the Court is justified in its conclusion
that the Eighth Amendment contains no guarantee of proportion-
ality. Furthermore, the Court in Harmelin leaves nothing open to
the subjective judgment of the judiciary regarding the proportion-
ality, or lack thereof, of legislative schemes of punishment.
154
Since the history of the Eighth Amendment is firmly rooted in
the English Declaration of Rights, the Court first examined the
purpose of the English Declaration and concluded that its "cruell
and unusuall Punishments" prohibition was directed at the illegal-
ity of the sentences at the time rather than their disproportional-
ity. 55 Additionally, the text of the English Declaration of Rights
did not literally refer to punishments which were "disproportion-
ate" or even "excessive."' 5  The Court concluded that the Eighth
Amendment prohibition was intended to disallow certain modes of
punishment and was particularly aimed at punishment methods
not "regularly or customarily employed."' 157 In explicitly rejecting
the three factors which the Solem Court deemed relevant to as-
sessing proportionality,' 58 the Court concluded that there was a
lack of applicable guidelines which could be applied to determine
proportionality.'59 In contrast, "cruel and unusual" modes of pun-
ishment can be recognized by utilizing history and accepted prac-
tices as a guide.'60 The Court definitively stated that "the propor-
150. Id at 2686.
151. Solem v Helm, 463 US 277 (1983), was a 5-4 decision. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at
2686.
152. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2686.
153. Id.
154. Id at 2696-97.
155. Id at 2687-88. See notes 25, 26 and accompanying text.
156. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2687. The text of the English Declaration of Rights is set
out in note 19.
157. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2691.
158. The three factors appear in note 37.
159. Harmelin, 111 S Ct at 2697.
160. Id at 2696.
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tionality principle becomes an invitation to the imposition of
subjective values."
161
The danger that a proportionality requirement may lead to sub-
jective interpretation cannot be underestimated. Justice Kennedy
in his concurring opinion concluded that, although strict propor-
tionality betveen the crime and the punishment are not required
by the Eighth Amendment, sentences which are "grossly dispro-
portionate" to the crime are prohibited. 6 2 Justice Kennedy consid-
ered the amount of cocaine which the petitioner possess6d as well
as the potential harm which society could suffer and concluded
that no inference of gross disproportionality resulted when the pe-
titioner's crime of drug possession was compared to his sentence of
life in prison without possibility of parole. 63 Even though Justice
Kennedy reached the same result as the majority, the means he
employed to reach that result required the Court's subjective as-
sessment that Harmelin's crime was not "grossly disproportionate"
to the sentence which he received. It is this subjectivity which the
Court in Harmelin feared and sought to avoid.
An important consideration in assessing the appropriateness of
punishments is the legislative discretion employed in their crea-
tion. Legislatures must be permitted to objectively identify the
pervasive problems present in their state which they believe can be
effectively addressed by an appropriate scheme of punishment.
The Michigan legislature, in this case, has recognized the gravity of
the drug problem and has developed penalties which it believes are
warranted by the severity of the offenses. The United States Su-
preme Court would risk the danger of disregarding the effect of the
state's judgment if a proportionality principle were applied. The
petitioner assumed a risk and was apprehended with a large quan-
tity of drugs, an offense which the Michigan legislature has deter-
mined should be punished by life in prison with no possibility of
parole. Michigan has already considered the severity of the offense
in fashioning the punishment, and the Eighth Amendment does
not allow the United States Supreme Court to preempt that judg-
ment by assessing whether they believe it is proportional.
In the time between the decisions in Solem and Harmelin, three
161. Id at 2697.
162. Id at 2705.
163. Id at 2705-07. The petitioner possessed over 1.5 pounds of cocaine which could
potentially yield 32,500-65,000 doses. Id at 2705. Justice Kennedy emphasized the connec-
tion between drugs and violent crime and concluded that "grave harm to society" could
result from the petitioner's conduct. Id at 2706.
1992
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new justices were added to the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justices Powell and Brennan were replaced by Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter. These new justices accounted for
three of the five members of the majority in Harmelin, and thus it
appears that they significantly contributed to the change in the
Court's position since the Solem decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O'Connor complete the Harmelin majority. It appears
that the recent departure of Justice Marshall and the addition of
Justice Clarence Thomas will do little to affect the Court's position
on the issue of proportionality in the Eighth Amendment, as Jus-
tice Thomas could either add to the majority of five which already
exists or take the place among the four dissenters left vacant by
Justice Marshall.
Among the majority of five, however, Justices O'Connor, Ken-
nedy, and Souter filed a concurring opinion in which they advocate
a type of proportionality requirement. They contend that the
Eighth Amendment does not contain a guarantee of strict propor-
tionality between the crime and the sentence, but prohibits only
extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportionate" to the
crime."" If Justice Thomas shares this view, only one more vote is
required to make this position the majority. It is unlikely however
that either Chief Justice Rehnquist or Justice Scalia will readily
relinquish their belief that the Eighth Amendment contains no
proportionality guarantee. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, it
is unlikely that those who are convicted of crimes punishable by
extremely harsh prison terms will be able to successfully challenge
their sentences under the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual
punishments" clause.
Christine D. Marton
164. Id at 2705.
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